Commonwealth Court Upholds Sudden Emergency Rule and Excludes Evidence of Post Accident Alterations

In Mitchell v. Milburn, No. 344 C.D. 2017 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec.6, 2018), the Commonwealth Court upheld the sudden emergency doctrine as a defense when a defendant finds him or herself in a perilous situation which leaves little or no time to apprehend a situation and act accordingly. See Levey v. DeNardo, 725 A.2d 733, 735 (Pa. 1999).  The Court also excluded evidence of post accident road alterations.

The Plaintiff was involved in a three vehicle accident on Route 73 when her vehicle was struck by defendant Millburn, causing it to flip onto its roof. The Plaintiff’s vehicle was then struck by a vehicle operated by defendant Lewis. Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Millburn, Lewis and PennDOT.  Plaintiff settled with Millburn with a joint tortfeasor release.  At trial, the jury attributed one hundred percent negligence (100%) to defendant Millburn and awarded $2,315,693.00.

Plaintiff filed post trial motions claiming the trial court erred in granting defendant Lewis’ motion for nonsuit regarding the sudden emergency doctrine and sustained PennDOT’s objection to the attempt to introduce evidence of post accident alterations to the intersection where the accident occurred. 

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reviewed the record and found “the uncontroverted evidence established the existence of a sudden emergency as a matter of law, and there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant Lewis had sufficient time to stop his vehicle, drove at an unsafe speed, or otherwise acted negligently in operating his vehicle.” The Court upheld the longstanding practice in Pennsylvania that cases involving “sudden emergencies” be assessed on a case by case basis.

The Court also addressed the fact that the “mere happening” of an accident is not evidence of negligence and “conduct is negligent only if the harmful consequences thereof could be reasonably foreseen and prevented.” Butler v. City of Pittsburg, 537 A.2d 112, 114-115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988).

Finally, the Court held that defendant PennDOT’s substantial alteration of the intersection where the accident occurred was inadmissible as a subsequent remedial measure.

Jennifer L. Stauffer

Office: Bethlehem
Phone: (610) 954-6873
Email: jstauffer@forryullman.com
Practice Areas: Commercial Litigation, First Party PIP / MPC, Fraud / SIU, General Liability, Premises Liability, Third Party, UM/UIM